

# MARKETS & VALUES SUMMER WORKSHOP 2022

## WORKSHOP ON AUTONOMY & PATERNALISM

**MONDAY, 2022-06-27**

**13:45 – 14:00** CEST  
07:45 – 08:00 EDT

**Welcome**  
Organizing Team

**14:00 – 16:00** CEST  
08:00 - 10:00 EDT

**Session I**

14:00 – 14:30 CEST  
08:00 - 08:30 EDT

**Free to fail? Paternalistic preferences in the United States**  
Henning Hermes, DICE Düsseldorf

14:40 – 15:10 CEST  
08:40 - 09:10 EDT

**Support for government paternalism in a comparative perspective: Similar patterns, different intensity**  
Clareta Treger, Tel Aviv University

15:20 – 15:50 CEST  
09:20 – 09:50 EDT

**Group decisions are more libertarian than individual decisions**  
Felix Kölle, University of Cologne

**16:00 – 17:00** CEST  
10:00 – 11:00 EDT

**Break**

**17:00 – 18:00** CEST  
11:00 – 12:00 EDT

**Keynote I**

**Autonomy and incentives in organisations**  
Oriana Bandiera, London School of Economics

**18:00 – 20:00** CEST  
12:00 – 14:00 EDT

**Session II**

18:00 – 18:30 CEST  
12:00 – 12:30 EDT

**Intrinsic preferences for autonomy**  
Jana Freundt, University of Fribourg

18:40 – 19:10 CEST  
12:40 – 13:10 EDT

**On the economic value of decision rights: An experimental test**  
Christine Meemann, Helmut-Schmidt-University Hamburg

19:20 – 19:50 CEST  
13:20 – 13:50 EDT

**Paternalism attitudes and the happiness value of fundamental freedoms**  
Sven Simon, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

All times in CEST (Berlin time). Register at: <https://uni-koeln.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJ0kduGqrz8tHNM2xFunSRtdZHRndb3DJ0b2>

Contact: [strang@wiso.uni-koeln.de](mailto:strang@wiso.uni-koeln.de) and [apffelstaedt@wiso.uni-koeln.de](mailto:apffelstaedt@wiso.uni-koeln.de)

# MARKETS & VALUES SUMMER WORKSHOP 2022

## WORKSHOP ON AUTONOMY & PATERNALISM

**TUESDAY, 2021-06-28**

**14:00 – 16:00** CEST  
08:00 – 10:00 EDT

### Session III

14:00 – 14:30 CEST  
08:00 – 08:30 EDT

#### Receiving credit: On delegation and responsibility

Yadi Yang, Nanjing Audit University

14:40 – 15:10 CEST  
08:40 – 09:10 EDT

#### Social distance and delegation: altruism or expected reciprocity?

Hamideh Mohtashami Borzadaran, University of Birmingham

15:20 – 15:50 CEST  
09:20 – 09:50 EDT

#### Choice architecture and transparency

Essi Kujansuu, University of Innsbruck

**16:00 – 17:00** CEST  
10:00 – 11:00 EDT

### Blitztalks (5 min each)

#### Taking a load off: Experimental evidence of preferences for control with an application to residential electricity demand

Christina McGranaghan, University of Delaware

#### Paternalism in data sharing

Max R. P. Grossmann, University of Cologne

#### Do as I do: Paternalism and preference differences in decision making for others

Georgia Buckle, University of Portsmouth

#### Incentives to persevere

Elif Incekara Hafalir, University of Technology Sydney

#### Identity and resistance against choice restrictions

Lukas Reinhardt, University of Cologne

#### Systematic comparison of decision-theoretic sound self-nudging with (traditional) nudging and boosting

Johannes Siebert, Management Center Innsbruck

#### Disgusted on being reminded about the bad consequence! A field experiment on the effect of information intervention on exercise

Zhibo Xu, Shenzhen University

#### Identifying coercion aversion in a lab

Pei-Hsun Hsieh, Stonybrook University

#### Motivated reasoning, information avoidance, and default bias

Katharina Momsen, University of Innsbruck

**17:00 – 18:00** CEST  
11:00 – 12:00 EDT

### Break/breakout rooms (individual feedback on Blitztalks)

All times in CEST (Berlin time). Register at: <https://uni-koeln.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJ0kduGqrz8tHNM2xFunSRtdZHRndb3DJ0b2>

Contact: [strang@wiso.uni-koeln.de](mailto:strang@wiso.uni-koeln.de) and [apffelstaedt@wiso.uni-koeln.de](mailto:apffelstaedt@wiso.uni-koeln.de)

# MARKETS & VALUES SUMMER WORKSHOP 2022

## WORKSHOP ON AUTONOMY & PATERNALISM

### TUESDAY, 2022-06-28

**18:00 – 20:00** CEST  
12:00 – 14:00 EDT

#### Session IV

18:00 – 18:30 CEST  
12:00 – 12:30 EDT

**Do financial incentives have negative unintended consequences? Evidence from payments for vaccinations**  
Florian Schneider, University of Zurich

18:40 – 19:10 CEST  
12:40 – 13:10 EDT

**Behavioral food subsidies**  
Andy Brownback, University of Arkansas

19:20 – 19:50 CEST  
13:20 – 13:50 EDT

**Why nudge?**  
Natalie Gold, London School of Economics

### WEDNESDAY, 2022-06-29

**14:00 – 16:00** CEST  
08:00 – 10:00 EDT

#### Session V

14:00 – 14:30 CEST  
08:00 – 08:30 EDT

**Paternalism in a world of uncertainty: An experimental study**  
Ye (Wendy) Jin, NYU Shanghai

14:40 – 15:10 CEST  
08:40 – 09:10 EDT

**Cancel the deal? An experimental study on the exploitation of irrational consumers**  
Stefan Meissner, Norwegian School of Economics

15:20 – 15:50 CEST  
09:20 – 09:50 EDT

**On pro-social behavior, authority and the strength of the welfare state**  
Denise Huber, University of Regensburg

**16:00 – 17:00** CEST  
10:00 – 11:00 EDT

#### Break

**17:00 – 18:00** CEST  
11:00 – 12:00 EDT

#### Keynote II

**A hybrid approach to behavioral welfare economics, with an application to the value of autonomy**  
B. Douglas Bernheim, Stanford University

**18:00 – 20:00** CEST  
12:00 – 14:00 EDT

#### Session VI

18:00 – 18:30 CEST  
12:00 – 12:30 EDT

**When do individuals give up agency? The role of decision avoidance**  
Holly Dykstra, University of Konstanz

18:40 – 19:10 CEST  
12:40 – 13:10 EDT

**Control aversion in hierarchies**  
Florian Engl, University of Regensburg

19:20 – 19:50 CEST  
13:20 – 13:50 EDT

**Default-setting and default bias: Does the choice architect matter?**  
David Freeman, Simon Fraser University

**20:00 – 20:15** CEST  
14:00 – 14:15 EDT

#### Farewell

Organizing team

All times in CEST (Berlin time). Register at: <https://uni-koeln.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJ0kduGqrz8tHNM2xFunSRtdZHRndb3DJ0b2>

Contact: [strang@wiso.uni-koeln.de](mailto:strang@wiso.uni-koeln.de) and [apffelstaedt@wiso.uni-koeln.de](mailto:apffelstaedt@wiso.uni-koeln.de)

## Abstracts

# Summer Workshop 2022: Autonomy & Paternalism Cologne, Germany, June 27-29

### Session I

#### Free to fail? Paternalistic preferences in the United States

Henning Hermes, DICE Düsseldorf

We study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale, incentivized experiments with participants sampled from the general population in the United States. Participants decide whether to intervene to prevent another individual, the stakeholder, from making a mistake. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the willingness to intervene; only about a third of the spectators intervene by restricting the stakeholder's choices set, while a large majority intervene by providing information. We introduce a theoretical framework which allows us to classify fifty percent of the spectators as libertarian paternalists and to explore the main reasons why people are libertarian paternalists.

**Date:**

2022-06-27, 14:00 – 14:30 CEST (08:00 – 08:30 EDT)

#### Support for government paternalism in a comparative perspective: Similar patterns, different intensity

Clareta Treger, Tel Aviv University

When do individuals prefer coercive paternalism over its non-coercive alternative – nudges? In an experimental study conducted in the U.S. and Israel, I test the effect of the interaction between coercion level and policy domain on public support for government paternalism. In line with my theoretical expectations, in both countries coercive policies dominate nudges in domains that relate to basic needs (e.g., safety and health), while non-coercive policies are generally preferred in domains such as welfare and morals. Whereas patterns of support are strikingly similar in these two countries, I find differences in the intensity of support.

**Date:**

2022-06-27, 14:40 – 15:10 CEST (08:40 – 09:10 EDT)

#### Group decisions are more libertarian than individual decisions

Felix Kölle, University of Cologne

We conduct laboratory experiments to study why, when, and how groups intervene in other people's choices, and how the intervention behavior of groups differs from that of individuals. Across two different decision situations, we report robust evidence that groups are less likely to intervene in others' choices than individuals. Exploiting the content of group chats, we show that the difference between groups and individuals is due to social-image concerns: group members shy away from proposing interventions during the group discussions.

**Date:**

2022-06-27, 15:20 – 15:50 CEST (09:20 – 09:50 EDT)

## Abstracts

# Summer Workshop 2022: Autonomy & Paternalism Cologne, Germany, June 27-29

### Session II

#### **Intrinsic preferences for autonomy**

Jana Freundt, University of Fribourg

Our paper provides large-scale evidence for the existence of intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy. We introduce a novel and widely applicable incentivized measurement tool for intrinsic preferences for autonomy, and show that such preferences exist in two large international samples. Second, we assess the antecedents of intrinsic preferences for autonomy by relating our preference measure to existing personality measures from psychology. We validate a simple survey measure of intrinsic preferences for autonomy in a pre-registered replication study. Finally, we relate our measure of intrinsic preferences for autonomy to political preferences, attitudes and beliefs.

**Date:**

2022-06-27, 18:00 – 18:30 CEST (12:00 – 12:30 EDT)

#### **On the economic value of decision rights: An experimental test**

Christine Meemann, Helmut-Schmidt-University Hamburg

The economic value of a decision right is reflected not only in its instrumental value, but also in an additional intrinsic value. Building upon findings from previous experiments, I use a novel laboratory experiment to examine whether individuals value decision rights intrinsically, how intrinsic valuation depends on structural determinants of the decision, and why individuals value decision rights that have no instrumental benefits. I find decision rights to have intrinsic value which is conditioned by stake size, risk, and domain. Intrinsic-value assignment is positively correlated with a preference for self-determination and - in the domain of losses - with a preference for non-interference of others. Aversion to paternalism however is no significant motive behind intrinsic valuation.

**Date:**

2022-06-27, 18:40 – 19:10 CEST (12:40 – 13:10 EDT)

#### **Paternalism attitudes and the happiness value of fundamental freedoms**

Sven Simon, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Governmental regulations and prohibitions may effectively reduce self-harming behavior, but might also restrict personal freedom rights. This paper investigates into individuals' attitude to the trade-off between being protected from taking self-harming actions by the state, and the desire to be free to choose. We introduce the Governmental Paternalism Index to measure this attitude. Our results indicate considerable heterogeneity in how individuals support, or object to, such governmental prescriptions. More importantly, we show the importance of the attitude in a survey on life satisfaction during the Covid-19 pandemic. We find a reversed relationship between the preference for paternalistic state interventions and the valuation of personal freedoms. Individuals who prefer to have a larger choice set at the expense of committing potentially self-harming actions derive a higher value from personal freedoms in terms of life satisfaction.

**Date:**

2022-06-27, 19:20 – 19:50 CEST (13:20 – 13:50 EDT)

## Abstracts

# Summer Workshop 2022: Autonomy & Paternalism Cologne, Germany, June 27-29

### Session III

#### Receiving credit: On delegation and responsibility

Yadi Yang, Nanjing Audit University

Evidence has shown that blame for a "bad" decision can be shifted by delegating the decision to someone else. We conduct experiments to examine whether the reverse is also true: Does one receive credit for taking a "good" decision as compared to delegating the decision to someone else? Our results indicate that the answer is affirmative. A person receives higher rewards when she makes a fair decision herself than when a delegate does. This indicates that responsibility attribution is a double-edged sword that applies to both bad and good outcomes.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 14:00 – 14:30 CEST (08:00 – 08:30 EDT)

#### Social distance and delegation: altruism or expected reciprocity?

Hamideh Mohtashami Borzadaran, University of Birmingham

In this paper, we conduct two studies to examine experimentally whether delegation is a function of social distance and disentangle which behavioural motives drive decision-making. In Study 1, we use a principal-agent setting and vary the social distance between principals and recipients. We find that decreasing social distance makes principals more pro-social and less likely to make delegation decisions. We also conduct a follow-up experiment exploring which pro-social motives may drive principals' delegation decisions. Our focus is on the role of altruistic motives and the expectation of future reciprocal favours. We find that it is directed altruism that drives the lower likelihood of delegation when social distance is reduced.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 14:40 – 15:10 CEST (08:40 – 09:10 EDT)

#### Choice architecture and transparency

Essi Kujansuu, University of Innsbruck

Do nudges influence behavior as effectively when people are aware of nudging (nudged transparently) as when they are unaware? Do choice architects use nudges differently under transparency? I distinguish two kinds of nudges: System 1 nudges (e.g., defaults) provide quick decision-making shortcuts and System 2 nudges encourage reflective thinking (e.g., cost-benefit analysis). Transparency is predicted to only reduce the effectiveness and use of System 1 nudges. With an online experiment, I find that transparency does not affect how Choice Architects use nudges. The effects of System 1 nudges are somewhat weakened by transparency, but System 2 nudges are unaffected.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 15:20 – 15:50 CEST (09:20 – 09:50 EDT)

## Abstracts

# Summer Workshop 2022: Autonomy & Paternalism Cologne, Germany, June 27-29

### Blitztalks

#### **Taking a load off: Experimental evidence of preferences for control with an application to residential electricity demand**

Christina McGranaghan, University of Delaware

The rising share of renewable electricity generation has led to an increased focus on demand-side mechanisms to balance the grid. Direct Load Control contracts allow utilities to directly curtail the electricity use of participating households at times of system stress. I use a novel experimental design to show that intrinsic preferences for control can significantly impact the rewards required to encourage consumers to participate in this type of contract. I find that participants, on average, exhibit a control premium of 9-32% above the instrumental value of the decision. This premium responds to both the probability and stakes of ceding control.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 16:00 – 16:05 CEST (10:00 – 10:05 EDT)

#### **Paternalism in data sharing**

Max R. P. Grossmann, University of Cologne

In our experiment, Choosers set a Willingness-to-Accept for publication of personal data. Choice Architects can intervene by setting minimum and/or maximum prices to prevent publication beyond Choosers' preferences. 30% of CAs set a minimum price; few set maximum prices. The WTA of CAs setting a minimum price stochastically first-order dominates WTAs of non-interventionists. Correlating minimum prices with interventionists' own WTAs, we find a strong relationship, but that relationship does not extend to other privacy preferences (CFIP, two revealed preferences measures). CAs grant Choosers some liberty to express their own preferences. Bias in beliefs abounds, hinting at a false consensus effect.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 16:05 – 16:10 CEST (10:05 – 10:10 EDT)

#### **Do as I do: Paternalism and preference differences in decision making for others**

Georgia Buckle, University of Portsmouth

We study whether agents impose their risk preferences onto investments for others paternalistically and whether they impose them more, the more the others' risk preference differs from their own. We conduct an online experiment, where participants make an investment decision for themselves and for another participant, using the strategy method to elicit decisions for every possible investment the other participant could have made, such that agents have complete information of their recipient's risk preference. We find that agents do project their risk preferences onto others' investments, and impose their preference more, the more the recipient's preference differs from their own.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 16:10 – 16:15 CEST (10:10 – 10:15 EDT)

#### **Incentives to persevere**

Elif Incekara Hafalir, University of Technology Sydney

Achieving success often requires persistent effort. We study the effectiveness of two reward mechanisms, all-or-nothing and piece-rate, to incentivize full completion of repeated tasks over time. Our theoretical analysis shows that exogenously imposing the all-or-nothing mechanism can be ineffective due to the potential discouragement effect. In contrast, empowering individuals to choose between the two reward mechanisms can significantly improve the full completion rate. Data from a series of field experiments and follow up replications provide robust evidence that the all-or-nothing mechanism is effective only when it is presented as an option. Our results highlight the importance of choice in incentivizing persistent effort.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 16:15 – 16:20 CEST (10:15 – 10:20 EDT)

## Abstracts

# Summer Workshop 2022: Autonomy & Paternalism Cologne, Germany, June 27-29

### Blitztalks (continued)

#### Identity and resistance against choice restrictions

Lukas Reinhardt, University of Cologne

For states and organizations to function well, their citizens or members must give up their independence to some degree and accept a certain level of choice restrictions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that resistance against choice restrictions is especially strong when the creators of the choice restriction are perceived as an outgroup. We test whether a (non-) shared identity with the creator of a given choice restriction affects the resistance against the choice restriction in 4 different contexts. We disentangle motives to resist choice restrictions and distinguish between material motives and an intrinsic willingness to have an unrestricted choice set.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 16:20 – 16:25 CEST (10:20 – 10:25 EDT)

#### Systematic comparison of decision-theoretic sound self-nudging with (traditional) nudging and boosting

Johannes Siebert, Management Center Innsbruck

Critical voices claim that the mere existence of a decision architect potentially limits the freedom of choice. This argument can only be invalidated if the decision-maker is her own decision architect. Therefore, in his 2020 book “Give Yourself a Nudge”, Ralph Keeney extended the concept of nudging. The core idea is to empower decision-makers to become their own decision architects based on decision-theoretic sound concepts. In this talk, we compare decision-theoretical sound self-nudging with other interventions such as (traditional) nudging and boosting. Thereby, we show how developments in the field of behavioral economics and decision analysis can complement each other.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 16:25 – 16:30 CEST (10:25 – 10:30 EDT)

#### Disgusted on being reminded about the bad consequence! A field experiment on the effect of information intervention on exercise

Zhibo Xu, Shenzhen University

While information intervention has the benefit of inducing attention and providing new information on the subject when the individuals are not aware of it, it may come with a cost that individuals may feel their autonomy being eroded, inducing them to take actions opposite of what the intervention aims to achieve. We conduct a field experiment to investigate the effect of different information interventions on inducing people to exercise. We find a positive/negative effect of health/social comparison information intervention for subjects with no exercise habit. However, for subjects with exercise habit, there is a negative/positive effect of Health/social comparison information.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 16:30 – 16:35 CEST (10:30 – 10:35 EDT)

#### Identifying coercion aversion in a lab

Pei-Hsun Hsieh, Stonybrook University

Do humans trade-off between their own self-interest or social welfare and other people's freedom of choice? I conducted a novel laboratory experiment to identify a phenomenon of non-material social preference, coercion aversion, that a decision-maker would discount a choice that potentially compels others. A sequence of tasks was used to measure coercion aversion, in which subjects decided if to force both players to contribute all endowments in a two-player public goods game. Coercion aversion implies that when a policy restricts other people's freedom, a decision-maker would require a premium from either self-interest or social welfare to compensate.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 16:35 – 16:40 CEST (10:35 – 10:40 EDT)



## Abstracts

# Summer Workshop 2022: Autonomy & Paternalism Cologne, Germany, June 27-29

### Blitztalks (continued)

#### Motivated reasoning, information avoidance, and default bias

Katharina Momsen, University of Innsbruck

We investigate whether the presence of a default interacts with the willingness of decision-makers to gather, process and consider information. In an online experiment, where about 2,300 participants choose between two compiled charity donation options worth \$100, we vary the availability of information and the presence of a default. Information avoidance, when possible, increases default effects considerably, manifesting a hitherto undocumented channel of the default bias. Moreover, we show that defaults trigger motivated reasoning: In the presence of a default, even if self-selected, participants consider new information to a lower degree than without a preselected option.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 16:40 – 16:45 CEST (10:40 – 10:45 EDT)

## Abstracts

# Summer Workshop 2022: Autonomy & Paternalism Cologne, Germany, June 27-29

### Session IV

#### **Do financial incentives have negative unintended consequences? Evidence from payments for vaccinations**

Florian Schneider, University of Zurich

Financial incentives to encourage healthy behaviors often trigger initial behavioral change, but a large academic literature cautions against using them. Critics warn that financial incentives can crowd out prosocial motivations and reduce perceived safety and trust, thereby reducing healthy behavior when no payments are offered. We report findings from a large-scale, pre-registered study that causally measures the unintended consequences of offering financial incentives for taking a first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. We use a unique combination of random exposure to financial incentives, population-wide administrative vaccination records, and rich survey data. We find no negative consequences of financial incentives.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 18:00 – 18:30 CEST (12:00 – 12:30 EDT)

#### **Behavioral food subsidies**

Andy Brownback, University of Arkansas

We conduct a field experiment with low-income shoppers to study how behavioral interventions can improve the effectiveness of healthy food subsidies. Our unique design enables us to deliver subsidies both before and during grocery shopping. We examine the effects of two non-restrictive changes to the choice environment: giving shoppers agency over the subsidy they receive and introducing a waiting period before a subsidized shopping trip to prompt deliberation about upcoming purchases. These interventions increase healthy food spending by 61% more than a healthy food subsidy alone, resulting in 199% greater healthy spending than in our unsubsidized control group.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 18:40 – 19:10 CEST (12:40 – 13:10 EDT)

#### **Why nudge?**

Natalie Gold, London School of Economics

Many nudges involve intertemporal choice, influencing people to make a decision that is in their long-term interests. Thaler and Sunstein argue that the policy-maker is justified to intervene on the grounds of 'Libertarian Paternalism'. I re-think why intervention is justified in these cases by starting with the individual agent's justification for engaging in self-nudging. This is surprisingly hard to justify in decision theory; I show how a model with multiple levels of agency can solve that problem and elucidate the normative pressures that underpin resisting temptation. Then I consider how these could also provide a justification for policy-makers to nudge.

**Date:**

2022-06-28, 19:20 – 19:50 CEST (13:20 – 13:50 EDT)

## Abstracts

# Summer Workshop 2022: Autonomy & Paternalism Cologne, Germany, June 27-29

### Session V

#### Paternalism in a world of uncertainty: An experimental study

Ye (Wendy) Jin, NYU Shanghai

When are people more strongly motivated to intervene in others' decisions under risk? We consider three dimensions, the difficulty of the decision problems, the informational advantage of the Choice Architect (CA), and the experience of the CA. CA's were found to be significantly more likely to intervene when the decision problem is easier, suggesting the higher sensitivity of their own judging problem. Experience marginally significantly increased intervention. There was no impact of the Info treatment on the propensity to intervene, but given intervention, the CA's tended to keep the option with higher expected returns in the Info treatment.

**Date:**

2022-06-29, 14:00 – 14:30 CEST (08:00 – 08:30 EDT)

#### Cancel the deal? An experimental study on the exploitation of irrational consumers

Stefan Meissner, Norwegian School of Economics

Consumers can be exploited because they make mistakes in their valuation of products. We present the results from an experimental study that examines whether third-party spectators want to cancel a deal where a buyer has made a mistake in the valuation of a product and agreed to pay more for the product than the seller knows it is worth. We find that the majority of the spectators cancel such deals. A large minority, however, are willing to uphold the deal. Our results shed light on when people view market transactions as acceptable and their attitudes to government regulation of businesses.

**Date:**

2022-06-29, 14:40 – 15:10 CEST (08:40 – 09:10 EDT)

#### On pro-social behavior, authority and the strength of the welfare state

Denise Huber (University of Regensburg)

I examine experimentally if and why inactive authorities in strong welfare states risk social welfare. In a two-stage choice experiment with potential negative externalities and an authority that could enforce pro-social behavior, I analyze the consequences of inactive authorities in a strong (Sweden) and a liberal (USA) welfare state on individual pro-social behavior. The results show that Swedes act less pro-social when the authority is inactive, while Americans' behavior is unaffected. Further, individuals who support and accept more and harsher paternalistic measures are more likely to behave selfish when authorities are inactive, indicating a shift in responsibility toward the authority.

**Date:**

2022-06-29, 15:20 – 15:50 CEST (09:20 – 09:50 EDT)

## Abstracts

# Summer Workshop 2022: Autonomy & Paternalism Cologne, Germany, June 27-29

### Session VI

#### When do individuals give up agency? The role of decision avoidance

Holly Dykstra, University of Konstanz

A common policy problem is that individuals reject recommended options and insist on making their own choices. Via a large-scale experiment, we document and investigate what factors contribute to this preference for agency. Our main results show that individuals' willingness to give up their agency increases when they are less determined about what they would choose. Additional results suggest that this is because when they are less determined about what they would choose, forgoing agency allows them to avoid making decisions.

**Date:**

2022-06-29, 18:00 – 18:30 CEST (12:00 – 12:30 EDT)

#### Control aversion in hierarchies

Florian Engl, University of Regensburg

Superiors' control decisions aimed at disciplining self-interested workers may backfire by decreasing the effort provided by workers with non-pecuniary motives. In this paper, we investigate whether hierarchical distance alleviates the behavioral reaction to control. In a laboratory experiment, we test whether negative reactions to imposed control are larger when they are implemented by a direct superior rather than a hierarchically more distant superior. We find that hierarchical proximity indeed magnifies control aversion. We discuss several potential channels for this result.

**Date:**

2022-06-29, 18:40 – 19:10 CEST (12:40 – 13:10 EDT)

#### Default-setting and default bias: Does the choice architect matter?

David Freeman, Simon Fraser University

This paper studies how choices are influenced by the procedure used to select the default option. We develop an approach to test and compare default bias across different default-setting rules while controlling for heterogeneous preferences. We apply it to a within-subjects experimental design lottery choice experiment to compare four different default-setting rules: Random defaults, Custom defaults selected based on an individual's own past choices, Social defaults selected based on others' choices, and Expert-set defaults. We find that the content of default-setting rules matters: default bias is present for all non-random default-setting rules we study, but not for randomly-set defaults.

**Date:**

2022-06-29, 19:20 – 19:50 CEST (13:20 – 13:50 EDT)