Mechanism Design, Auctions, Contests

Mengxi Zhang is an Associate Professor (with tenure) in the Department of Economics at the University of Bonn. She is also a member of the Hausdorff Center for Mathematics, the Collaborative Research Center CRC TR 224, and ECONtribute: Markets & Public Policy. She received her PhD in Economics from Boston University. Her primary research interests are in Microeconomic Theory, with a particular focus on Mechanism Design and Contest Theory.

Published papers

• Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection

  Gershkov, A., Moldovanu, B., Strack, P., & Zhang, M. (2023). Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection. American Economic Review, 113(10), 2581–2614.

• Optimal Auctions: Non-expected Utility and Constant Risk Aversion

  Gershkov, A., Moldovanu, B., Strack, P., & Zhang, M. (2022). Optimal auctions: Non-expected utility and constant risk aversion. The Review of Economic Studies.

• A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

  Gershkov, A., Moldovanu, B., Strack, P., & Zhang, M. (2021). A theory of auctions with endogenous valuations. Journal of Political Economy, 129(4), 1011-1051.

Discussion papers

• Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors

• Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses and Adverse Selection