Francesc Dilmé is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Microeconomics at the University of Bonn. He studied Mathematics and Physics in Barcelona, Economics (MSc) in London, and received his PhD from the University of Pennsylvania in 2013. Francesc has been a visiting scholar at the University of California in Berkeley. He is also a member of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics and the Hausdorff Center for Mathematics (HCM). In 2020 he was awarded the ERC starting grant “Information Transmission in Markets,” which runs from 2021 to 2026.

Published papers

• Repeated Trade with Imperfect Information about Previous Transactions

  Dilmé, F. (2025). Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions. Theoretical Economics, 20(1), 209-254.

• A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts

  Dilme, F. & Garrett, D.F. (2025). A dynamic theory of random price discounts. Review of Economic Studies, rdaf074.

• Bargaining with Binary Private Information

  Dilmé, F. (2025). Bargaining with binary private information. Games and Economic Behavior, 152, 423-442.

• Sequentially Stable Outcomes

  Dilmé, F. (2024). Sequentially Stable Outcomes. Econometrica, 92(4), 1097–1134.

• Communication Between Unbiased Agents

  Dilmé, F. (2023). Communication between Unbiased Agents. Games and Economic Behavior.

• Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

  Dilmé, F., & Garrett, D. F. (2023) Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings. Econometrica.

• Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets

  Dilmé, F. (2023). Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets. Journal of Economic Theory.

• Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest

  Dilmé, F. (2022). Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest. Games and Economic Behavior.

Discussion papers

• Nash Equilibria as Limits of Equilibria of Nearby Finite Games

• Fully Self-Justifiable Outcomes

• Entry Deterrence with Public Signals: Revisiting the Chain-Store Paradox

• Sequential Equilibria in Mixed Strategies

• Repeated Trade with Imperfect Information about Previous Transactions

• Bargaining with Binary Private Information

• The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with Private Information

• Sequentially Stable Outcomes

• Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets

• Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

• A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts

• Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest

• The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers