Angewandte Mikroökonomie mit Schwerpunkt auf dynamische Modelle mit asymmetrischer Information und Kommunikation

Francesc Dilmé ist Professor am Institut für Mikroökonomie der Universität Bonn. Er studierte Mathematik und Physik in Barcelona, Wirtschaftswissenschaften (MSc) in London und promovierte 2013 an der University of Pennsylvania. Er war Gastwissenschaftler an der University of California, Berkeley und ist Mitglied der Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) und des Hausdorff Center for Mathematics (HCM). 2020 erhielt er den ERC Starting Grant „Information Transmission in Markets“.

Veröffentlichungen

• Sequentially Stable Outcomes

  Dilmé, F. (2024). Sequentially Stable Outcomes. Econometrica, 92(4), 1097–1134.

• Communication Between Unbiased Agents

  Dilmé, F. (2023). Communication between Unbiased Agents. Games and Economic Behavior.

• Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

  Dilmé, F., & Garrett, D. F. (2023) Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings. Econometrica.

• Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets

  Dilmé, F. (2023). Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets. Journal of Economic Theory.

• Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest

  Dilmé, F. (2022). Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest. Games and Economic Behavior.

Discussion Papers

• Repeated Trade with Imperfect Information about Previous Transactions

• Bargaining with Binary Private Information

• The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with Private Information

• Sequentially Stable Outcomes

• Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets

• Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

• A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts

• Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest

• The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers