Applied microeconomic theory, emphasis in dynamic models with asymmetric information and communication

Francesc Dilmé is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Microeconomics at the University of Bonn. He studied Mathematics and Physics in Barcelona, Economics (MSc) in London, and received his PhD from the University of Pennsylvania in 2013. Francesc has been a visiting scholar at the University of California in Berkeley. He is also a member of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics and the Hausdorff Center for Mathematics (HCM). In 2020 he was awarded the ERC starting grant “Information Transmission in Markets,” which runs from 2021 to 2026.

Published papers

• Communication Between Unbiased Agents

  Dilmé, F. (2023). Communication between Unbiased Agents. Games and Economic Behavior.

• Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest

  Dilmé, F. (2022). Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest. Games and Economic Behavior.

Discussion papers

• Bargaining with Binary Private Information

• The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with Private Information

• Sequentially Stable Outcomes

• Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets

• Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

• A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts

• Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest

• The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers