Bargaining, auctions, search, matching

Stephan Lauermann is a Professor of Economics at the University of Bonn. Before taking over the professorship in Bonn, he was an Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan and a Visiting Professor at the Cowles Foundation in Yale and the Northwestern University. He received his PhD at
the University of Bonn in 2007. Among other positions, Stephan is an Associate Editor at Econometrica and Theoretical Economics.

Published papers

• Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment

  Lauermann, S. & Wolinsky, A. (2025). Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment. The Review of Economic Studies, rdaf052.

• Bidding in a Common-Value Auction with an Unknown Number of Competitors

  Lauermann, S., & Speit, A. (2023). Bidding in Common‐Value Auctions With an Unknown Number of Competitors. Econometrica.

• A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation

  Lauermann, S., & Wolinsky, A. (2022) A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation. Theoretical Economics.

• The Balance Condition in Search‐and‐Matching Models

  Lauermann, S., Nöldeke, G., & Tröger, T. (2020). The Balance Condition in Search‐and‐Matching Models. Econometrica.

Discussion papers

• Informal Elections with Dispersed Information: Protests, Petitions, and Nonbinding Voting

• Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment

• Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections

• A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participatio

• Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections