Bargaining, auctions, search, matching

Stephan Lauermann is a Professor of Economics at the University of Bonn. Before taking over the professorship in Bonn, he was an Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan and a Visiting Professor at the Cowles Foundation in Yale and the Northwestern University. He received his PhD at the University of Bonn in 2007. Among other positions, Stephan is a member of the editorial board at the Review of Economic Studies and an Associate Editor at Econometrica and Theoretical Economics.

Published papers

• Bidding in a Common-Value Auction with an Unknown Number of Competitors

  Lauermann, S., & Speit, A. (2023). Bidding in Common‐Value Auctions With an Unknown Number of Competitors. Econometrica.

• A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation

  Lauermann, S., & Wolinsky, A. (2022) A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation. Theoretical Economics.

• The Balance Condition in Search‐and‐Matching Models

  Lauermann, S., Nöldeke, G., & Tröger, T. (2020). The Balance Condition in Search‐and‐Matching Models. Econometrica.

Discussion papers

• Informal Elections with Dispersed Information: Protests, Petitions, and Nonbinding Voting

• Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment

• Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections

• A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participatio

• Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections