Bargaining, Auktionen, Search-Matching-Theorie

Stephan Lauermann ist Professor für Wirtschaftswissenschaften an der Universität Bonn. Bevor er die Professur in Bonn übernahm, war er Juniorprofessor an der University of Michigan und Gastprofessor an der Cowles Foundation in Yale und der Northwestern University. Er promovierte 2007 an der Universität Bonn. Stephan Lauermann ist unter anderem Editor bei Econometrica und Theoretical Economics.

Veröffentlichungen

• Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment

  Lauermann, S. & Wolinsky, A. (2025). Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment. The Review of Economic Studies, rdaf052.

• Bidding in a Common-Value Auction with an Unknown Number of Competitors

  Lauermann, S., & Speit, A. (2023). Bidding in Common‐Value Auctions With an Unknown Number of Competitors. Econometrica.

• A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation

  Lauermann, S., & Wolinsky, A. (2022) A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation. Theoretical Economics.

• Information Aggregation in Poisson Elections

  Ekmekci, M., & Lauermann, S. (2022) Information Aggregation in Poisson Elections. Theoretical Economics.

• The Balance Condition in Search‐and‐Matching Models

  Lauermann, S., Nöldeke, G., & Tröger, T. (2020). The Balance Condition in Search‐and‐Matching Models. Econometrica.

Discussion Papers

• Informal Elections with Dispersed Information: Protests, Petitions, and Nonbinding Voting

• Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment

• Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections

• A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participatio

• Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections