Auktionen und Mechanism Design, mikroökonomische Theorie

Benny Moldovanu ist Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Bonn. Er studierte Mathematik an der Hebräischen Universität Jerusalem und promovierte in Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Bonn. Darüber hinaus ist er akademischer Direktor und Sprecher der Bonn Graduate School of Economics sowie einer der beiden Direktoren des Reinhard-Selten-Instituts.

Veröffentlichungen

• Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection

  Gershkov, A., Moldovanu, B., Strack, P., & Zhang, M. (2023). Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection. American Economic Review, 113(10), 2581–2614.

• Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice

  Kleiner, A., & Moldovanu, B. (2022). Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.

• Optimal Auctions: Non-expected Utility and Constant Risk Aversion

  Gershkov, A., Moldovanu, B., Strack, P., & Zhang, M. (2022). Optimal auctions: Non-expected utility and constant risk aversion. The Review of Economic Studies.

• Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications

  Kleiner, A., Moldovanu, B., & Strack, P. (2021). Extreme points and majorization: Economic applications. Econometrica.

• A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

  Gershkov, A., Moldovanu, B., Strack, P., & Zhang, M. (2021). A theory of auctions with endogenous valuations. Journal of Political Economy, 129(4), 1011-1051.

Discussion Papers

• Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors

• Voting with Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner

• Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses and Adverse Selection